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Abstract
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become a prominent feature of the international financial landscape. They are 
sufficiently diverse in their origins, structures, and objectives that generalizations are perilous. However, legitimate 
concerns have been raised in home and host countries about the management, behavior, and interactions of these funds. 
Many of those concerns can be addressed via increased accountability and transparency. The Santiago Principles are a 
good start in doing so, but my SWF scoreboard points to areas where these principles can be improved. Meanwhile, 
SWF compliance must be further increased. At the same time, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) effort to address concerns from the host-country side has not resulted in the erection of new barriers 
to that form of cross-border investment, but the OECD failed to reverse the creeping financial protectionism of the 
past decade. Because of their size and the source of their funding, some Asian funds are different. As a result, they 
will be held to a higher standard of accountability and transparency even as their government owners press for more 
openness to cross-border investment.
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1. IntroductIon
Governments engage in a wide range of economic and financial activities. Those activities include the 
accumulation of pools of financial assets in various institutional structures in anticipation of the use of 
the principal or earnings on the assets at some later date. Some of those assets may be located outside the 
country. One example of such pools of investments is a country’s international reserves. Governments 
may also own or control financial and non-financial entities with investments in other countries. A final 
example is what has come to be called a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). 
In this paper, I provide in the next section an overview of SWFs and review the public policy issues 
that SWFs pose for home and host countries. In the following section, I look at the response of the 
governments with SWFs to some of these public policy issues, including establishment of the Santiago 
Principles drawn up by the International Working Group (IWG) of SWFs. The Santiago Principles 
were, in part, inspired by my SWF scoreboard, which I employ to evaluate that effort. I also look at the 
responses of governments that are host to SWF investments, primarily via the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), to some of the issues that SWFs raise. I conclude with some 
thoughts on the future of SWFs in general and Asian SWFs in particular. Throughout, I focus primarily 
on 44 SWFs, as defined below, and nine government pension funds. I compare and contrast these 
53 entities of 37 countries with a subset of 11 SWFs and three government pension funds of 12 Asian 
countries.
2. overvIew of SwfS And Swf ISSueS
Sovereign wealth funds do not enjoy a fully operational, generally accepted definition. This is, in part, 
because governmental investment entities have different histories, derive their funding from different 
sources, and have different objectives. Gelpern (2011) goes so far as to argue that SWFs are an artificial 
category and a jumble of contradictions. 
“Sovereign wealth fund” is a descriptive term that I use to identify separate pools of government-
owned or controlled assets that include some international assets (Truman 2010). In this paper, I 
apply the specific definition adopted by the IWG of SWFs (IWG 2008). The IWG definition includes 
government pension reserve funds. These are funds that are not directly linked to the financing of social 
security systems but are expected to be used for that purpose in the future. The IWG definition does 
not include other forms of government pension funds.1 In this paper, I include a sample of government 
pension funds for purposes of comparison because they raise many of the same issues for public policy for 
home and host countries as SWFs and, in particular, pension reserve funds.2 3
A particular SWF may have one or more of a number of objectives. One classification (IMF 
2008) lists five: (1) stabilization funds designed to insulate the budget or the economy against price 
swings; (2) savings funds for future generations often transferring wealth that is underground into 
financial wealth aboveground; (3) reserve investment funds that are an adjunct to other arrangements for 
managing foreign exchange reserves and sometimes include a portion of the country’s foreign exchange 
reserves; (4) development funds that are organized to achieve various socioeconomic objectives at home 
or abroad and may resemble financial holding companies; and (5) contingent pension reserve funds, 
as already discussed, that are intended to backstop government pension funds. In practice, most funds 
have a mixture of objectives that often change over time with economic and financial circumstances. 
For example, a stabilization fund may grow in size and becomes more like a savings fund. For all these 
reasons, it is perilous to try to classify SWFs by objectives. 
Table 1 provides a list of 60 SWFs, including four pension reserve funds, of 44 countries; the year 
when each fund was first established; the principal sources of its financial resources; the size of its assets 
under management, or an estimate of its size, based on the most recent information available; and the 
amount of its foreign assets or an estimate thereof. The table provides, in the lower portion, information 
on nine government pension funds, including funds from an additional four countries. 
The total assets of the entities listed in table 1 are $5.9 trillion, $3.3 trillion in SWF assets and 
$2.6 trillion in assets of government pension funds.3 Asian funds account for 36 percent of SWFs 
assets listed in table 1 and 61 percent of the assets of the sample of government pension funds, which is 
dominated by Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund.
Of the 60 SWFs listed in table 1, 14 have estimated assets of at least $48 billion. Those funds 
account for 87 percent of total SWF assets. The eight SWFs with assets of $100 billion or more account 
for 75 percent of the total. Thus, the bulk of SWF assets are concentrated in a small number of funds and 
countries, which raises issues of their economic and financial power and influence. The 13 Asian SWFs 
listed in the table account for 36 percent of all SWF assets. Four of the funds have total assets of more 
than $100 billion. Asian countries are big players in the SWF universe both as a group and individually.
As a group, the SWFs listed in table 1 hold an estimated 86 percent of their portfolios in foreign 
assets. For the nine government pension funds, the share of foreign assets is substantially lower on average: 
33 percent. The share of foreign assets also is lower at 69 percent for the 13 Asian SWFs, in part reflecting 
the different origins of some of these funds. For example, Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), and Australia’s Future Fund were initially endowed with domestic assets, 
either primarily or exclusively. Although the CIC receives an inordinate amount of attention today; based 
on the latest available information, less than 25 percent of its balance sheet is in foreign assets.4
Total SWF assets sextupled between 2002 and 2007. Like other investment portfolios, SWFs 
portfolios took a hit in the global economic and financial crisis. Some countries also drew on their funds 
to finance domestic expenditures or financial support operations. However, a comparison of the data in 
table 1 with estimates compiled about a year ago and published in Truman (2010) suggest a growth of 
about 10 percent over the past year. The growth rate of Asian SWFs was somewhat higher.
The earliest government investment pool that today is described as an SWF was founded in 1953. It 
is now the Kuwait Investment Corporation. Of the 60 SWFs listed in table 1, three can trace their origins 
to before 1970. Seven were established in the 1970s, mostly in the context of the rise in oil prices during 
that period. A larger number (12) were established between 1980 and the mid-1990s. However, the bulk 
(more than 60 percent) were established over the past decade and a half as oil and other commodity prices 
rose and some countries built up large balances of foreign exchange reserves. More than half of these 
newest SWFs were established in 2004 or later. Seven of the 13 Asian SWFs were established after 1995, 
all except one of them after 2004. Thus, SWFs are not a new phenomenon, but, by number of funds, 
their presence in global finance and economic and financial relations recently has dramatically increased. 
Although the vast majority (about 70 percent) of the SWFs listed in table 1 receives funding 
from earnings on the export of natural resources, primarily petroleum or natural gas, such earnings are 
not the only source of SWF endowments. Four countries have diverted, or otherwise deployed, their 
foreign exchange reserves to fund their SWFs in whole or in part, including some of the largest funds.4 
Sometimes the foreign exchange reserves used to fund an SWF continue to be included as part of the 
country’s international reserves, and vice versa. However, about 20 percent of all countries with SWFs, 
fund them from sources other than directly from earnings from the export of natural resources or from 
foreign exchange reserves. Government pension fund are funded from either fiscal revenues or the 
contributions of employers and employees.
It is striking that all four SWFs that are funded from foreign exchange reserves are Asian, and only 
three of the Asian SWFs are funded from proceeds from the export of natural resources. More than half of 
the Asian SWFs receive their funding from other sources, primarily fiscal resources.
In partial summary of this background information on SWFs as it relates to the question of whether 
Asian SWFs are different, the following points are relevant: Asian SWFs are prominent in the SWF 
universe, and Asia is home to a disproportionate share of the largest funds. A somewhat lower share 
of Asian SWF assets are invested outside their home countries than for non-Asian funds. The number 
of Asian SWFs has increased as rapidly as the overall universe of funds. Since the global economic 
and financial crisis, assets under management of Asian funds have increased somewhat faster than the 
global total. The most striking feature differentiating Asian SWFs from those of other regions is the 
concentration of their funding on foreign exchange reserves and on sources other than the proceeds from 5
exports of natural resources. This feature is relevant because of the criticisms elsewhere of some of the 
policies that have led to large accumulations of foreign exchange reserves by some Asian countries.
Governments have established sovereign wealth funds in many different forms to achieve a range 
of objectives. In their international investment activities, SWFs are a manifestation of increased financial 
globalization as well as of shifts in economic and financial power relationships in the world economy. 
In my view, SWFs are not the most important aspect of the latter trend, but the issues and concerns 
that SWFs raise are important in their own right and indicative of more general concerns about the 
role of governments in international economic and financial matters. A government’s decisions about 
its international investments by any of its SWF affect four categories of interests: the government’s 
specific interests, and those of its citizens, of financial market participants at home and abroad, and of 
governments and citizens in other countries.5
In my research on SWFs (Truman 2007, 2008a, and 2010), I have identified, among many 
candidates, five broad areas of concern: (1) mismanagement of investments by SWFs to the economic 
and financial detriment of the citizens of the home country of the fund, who bear most of the economic 
and financial consequences of any mismanagement; (2) pursuit of national political or economic power 
objectives via SWFs; (3) exacerbation of financial protectionism inspired by actual or perceived threats 
from foreign SWFs; (4) the potential for financial market turmoil and uncertainty associated with SWF 
activities; and (5) conflicts of interest between countries with SWFs and countries in which they invest—
between home and host governments, between host governments and the funds, and between the funds 
and the general public in countries in which they invest. 
The first two concerns primarily involve the policies and behavior of the countries that are home 
to SWFs. It can be argued that these concerns are shared by all government-sponsored investment 
institutions, and it is important to appreciate the fact that SWFs are only one form of cross-border 
investments by governmental entities, or global public investors in the terminology of West et al (2011). 
In today’s world, the management of some countries’ reserves is little different from the management of 
SWF investments, and there are many other government-owned entities that invest abroad. However, 
for many countries with SWFs, their funds tend to the principal vehicle for foreign investment. For 
many host countries, SWFs are perceived to be more consequential and potentially threatening than 
other forms, because of their size. The second two concerns primarily involve the attitudes, policies, and 
markets of the host country to SWF investments. The last concern involves relationships between both 
groups of countries. 
Some argue that all these concerns are largely hypothetical—in particular concerns (2) and (4)—and 
not broadly supported by what we know about the behavior of SWFs. The second part of this statement 
may be correct, but the potential concerns are real. In a survey of attitudes of 1,000 representatives of 6
national elites in seven advanced and emerging-market countries, including China and India but not 
Japan, Hill & Knowlton and Penn Schoen Berland (2010) report that 50 percent are either much more 
(16 percent) or somewhat more (34 percent) concerned about SWFs as a source of finance than other 
sources of investment such as investment banks, insurance funds, private equity, and family wealth. 
According to this survey, only hedge funds generate more concern.
Are these concerns more or less relevant to Asian SWFs? This question is not easy to answer given 
the diversity of funds, in general, and the fact that Asian countries differ substantially in their stage of 
development and in their relations with other countries. For purposes of the discussion that follows, I 
include countries listed in table 1 that also have government pension funds, thus incorporating Japan 
which periodically actively contemplates establishing a SWF. Treating Hong Kong and China separately, 
13 Asian economies are represented in table 1. They range in stage of economic and financial development 
from Papua New Guinea to Japan. They include four OECD countries. Four of the economies have funds 
with combined assets of more than $300 billion: Japan, Singapore, China, and Hong Kong. 
The mismanagement of SWF assets is primarily a concern with respect to countries at a lower level 
of development such as Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam because these economies have 
proportionately more to lose as a result of corruption and asset mismanagement. With respect to countries 
using their SWFs to pursue political and economic power objectives, it should be recognized that there is 
a heavy dose of politics involved in SWFs and their investments, at least at the level of perception. This 
type of concern, for better or worse, is most often associated with larger countries, in particular countries 
that less than fully embrace the international norms and conventions of the mature industrial countries, 
such as China and to some extent Japan. 
Financial protectionism in SWF host countries is the flip side of political and economic power 
concerns about SWFs and their home countries and the motivations behind SWF investments. With 
respect to potential financial market turmoil and uncertainty, if these concerns are real, they are positively 
correlated with the size of countries’ SWFs. The SWFs of Singapore and to a lesser extent China and 
Korea were involved in investments or rumored investments in western financial institutions weakened 
by the global financial crisis. The actual investments helped to support these institutions although the 
SWFs and their government owners, in retrospect, may have regretted their investments. Based on 
this experience, the possibility cannot be dismissed that in the future SWFs could sell investments in 
weakened financial institutions and, thereby, contribute to financial volatility. In the case of Korea, in 
September 2008, there were reports of a bid by the Korean Development Bank for Lehman Brothers that 
never materialized. Although the Korean Development Bank is a state-owned bank, and not the Korean 
Investment Corporation (KIC), the distinction is lost on some observers, and the next time it could be 
the KIC.7
Finally, with respect to the potential for conflicts over the activities of SWFs, the Chinese authorities 
have been quite critical of the policies of the United States toward foreign investment, and the SWFs of 
Singapore have been involved in cross-border political controversies. With respect to OECD countries, it 
is notable that in 2008 New Zealand blocked the purchase of a substantial stake in the Auckland airport 
by the Canada Pension Plan, which resulted in an out of court settlement to cover the expenses the 
Canadian entity had incurred. More recently, political actions to freeze the assets of Libya and those of 
Muammer Gaddafi, his family, and associates have affected the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) and 
the operations of Libya’s central bank as well as the myriad of companies in which they have invested.
In summary, the fact that Asian SWFs are disproportionately funded out of foreign exchange 
reserves and sources other than the proceeds of exports of natural resources, and the fact that the policies 
that led to some of the accumulations of foreign exchange reserves (by China, Japan, Singapore, and 
potentially Korea) have been internationally criticized, suggests that the activities of some Asian funds will 
receive closer scrutiny than the SWFs of other countries.
3. PolIcy reSPonSeS
The emergence of SWFs as major players in the international financial arena in 2007 coming on the heals 
of the Dubai Ports World controversy in the United States in 2006—notwithstanding the fact that Dubai 
Ports World is not an SWF—led to collective responses by the major countries that are home to SWFs in 
the form of the Santiago Principles (Generally Accepted Principles and Practices of SWFs) and those that 
are host to many of their investments in the form of consideration by members of the OECD of whether 
a special regime should apply to SWF investments. The Santiago Principles is the most important of these 
responses and is considered first below. The OECD effort resulted essentially in a limited holding action 
against tightening the existing agreed framework governing foreign investments in OECD countries.
A. the Santiago Principles and the Swf Scoreboard
As anxiety and, largely uninformed, controversies over SWFs boiled up in 2007, I was among those 
advocating a collective effort to develop an internationally agreed standard for SWFs (Truman 2007). 
I developed a SWF scoreboard as a prototype for what became the Santiago Principles (Truman 2008a 
and 2008b). The Santiago Principles were developed under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) by the International Working Group of SWFs. Twenty-three countries, and at least one SWF from 
each, participated, including six Asian countries (Australia, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Timor-Leste), along with three observers, including Vietnam. The IWG completed its work in 
a remarkably short period of time and released the Santiago Principles (IWG 2008) to the public on 
October 11, 2008. The release was overshadowed by the global financial crisis that was raging at the time.68
The SWF scoreboard provides one metric for assessing the Santiago Principles and the work of the 
IWG of SWFs and IFSWF. The current version of the SWF scoreboard assesses the accountability and 
transparency of 44 SWFs and nine government pension funds from 37 countries.7 It consists of 33 elements 
based on systematic, regularly available, public information.8 Each element in the scoreboard asks simple 
questions that can be answered either yes or no. A “yes” receives a point, but we allow for partial credit. A 
“no” receives no credit. At least one SWF must receive a positive score on each element for that element to 
be included; normally several do. 
The elements of the SWF scoreboard are grouped in four categories: (1) structure of the fund, 
including its objectives, links to the government’s fiscal policy, and whether the fund is independent from 
the countries’ international reserves; (2) governance of the fund, including the roles of the government, 
of the board of the fund and of its managers, and whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate 
responsibility; (3) accountability and transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, investment 
activities, reporting, and audits; and (4) behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and its risk 
management policies, including the use of leverage and derivatives. 
For its part, the Santiago Principles include 30 principles and subprinciples that overlap with 25 of 
the 33 elements in the SWF scoreboard. This permits not only a comparison between the two standards as 
they are applied to SWFs, but also a basis for assessing the comprehensiveness of the Santiago Principles.9 
SWFs would score 76 out of 100 on the SWF scoreboard if they only complied completely with 
the Santiago Principles that overlap with the scoreboard, which of course is not generally the case; some 
SWFs comply with more and some with less. From the perspective of the SWF scoreboard, the most 
prominent omissions from the Santiago Principles are the failure to recommend that funds disclose 
their overall size (which most funds do with prominent exceptions, including Singapore’s GIC), they be 
separated from countries’ international reserves, they publish audits of their operations, and they report 
the currency composition of their investments. In addition, the Santiago Principles lack complete clarity 
on what should be, or need not be, publicly disclosed. The applicable standard should be to comply (via 
public disclosure) or to explain why a fund is not doing so. In other words, the Santiago Principles can be 
improved upon.
Table 2 provides a comparison drawn from Truman (2010) of the results of the 33 elements of the 
SWF scoreboard and the intersection of 25 of those elements with the Santiago Principles.10 With respect 
to the SWF scoreboard, for the full set of 44 SWFs and nine government pension funds, the average score 
is 60 compared with 63 on the Santiago Principles. For the 44 SWFs, the average score on the scoreboard 
is 54, while the score on the Santiago Principles is 58. For the nine government pension funds, the scores 
on average are higher: 85 on the scoreboard as a whole and 88 on the Santiago Principles.
What should one conclude from the results presented in table 2? 9
First, all SWFs are not the same in terms of either of these two standards of accountability and 
transparency. Nor do the funds cluster in one group with high scores and another group with very low 
scores. 
The SWFs can be arrayed broadly in three categories. Nine SWFs are between 80 and 97 on the 
SWF scoreboard; the Santiago Principles place 11 funds in that category. Three Asian SWFs are in the 
top category based on the SWF scoreboard, and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings joins them based on the 
standard of the Santiago Principles. At the other extreme, the SWF scoreboard places 13 funds at 30 or less, 
including the Brunei Investment Authority; this category of funds shrinks to nine based on the Santiago 
Principles. Thus, half the funds receive scores between 30 and 80 according to both standards, including 
the majority of the Asian SWFs.
Second, the correlation between size of a fund and its scores is positive though not significant, 
contrary to the often-heard assertion that larger funds are more opaque. Among the 13 funds with total 
assets in table 1 of more than $48 billion that we scored, the average is 54 right on that for all SWFs.11 
The average score for these largest SWFs on the Santiago Principles is 59, essentially the same as that for 
all SWFs.
Third, looking more closely at the two standards for transparency and accountability, the scores 
on the Santiago Principles are slightly higher on average (by 4 percentage points) but the difference is 
not significant. There are, however, substantial differences for some funds. The larger differences include 
those for the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 
Australia’s Future Fund, São Tomé and Príncipe’s National Oil Account, Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, 
and Kiribati’s Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund; for each fund, the difference is at least 9 percentage 
points. It may not be entirely a coincidence that three of these SWFs are in Asia. Singapore and Australia, 
in particular, were active members of the group that drew up the Santiago Principles. Thus, they were able 
to influence the content of the standard and, presumably, now feel greater pressure to bring their funds 
closer in line with it.12
Fourth, on both standards, the government pension funds score on average higher that the regular 
SWFs, almost all above 80. This pattern is not particularly surprising given that government pension 
funds, as well as SWFs set up as pension reserve funds, generally operate under tighter laws, regulations, 
and rules than one might expect would apply generally to the more broader universe of SWFs. However, 
an interesting point is that the government pension funds as a group and individually do not score 
uniformly higher than all of the SWFs.
Fifth, other comparisons reveal differences in average performance that are significant with respect 
to the SWF scoreboard (Truman 2010, table 5.2) and by extension the Santiago Principles. The SWFs 
of the countries that are members of the OECD score significantly higher on average than those of 10
non-members of the OECD. Among countries that are not members of the OECD, the average score 
for SWFs of countries in the Middle East is significantly lower than for the SWFs of other countries that 
are not members of the OECD. However, when it comes to a comparison of the average score for Asian 
SWFs and the funds of non-Asian, non-Middle Eastern, non-OECD countries, there is no significant 
difference.13 However, in each of these comparisons the standard deviations are large. For the small sample 
of government pension funds, those from Asia score markedly lower on average than the non-Asian funds 
though the latter are exclusively from countries that are members of the OECD and their performance 
might be expected to correlate with their tighter laws, regulations, and rules. On the other hand, it is 
notable that Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund is essentially at the bottom of this group of 
government pension funds from OECD countries.
Sixth, funds from the same country have different scores. See the range of scores for the funds of the 
United States and Canada as well as the United Arab Emirates. Two Asian countries have two funds each 
that have been scored: Singapore and China. In the case of Singapore, Temasek Holdings scores somewhat 
higher than the Government of Singapore Investment Company (GIC). For China, the National Social 
Security Fund scores somewhat higher than the CIC. 
A final comparison is between the SWF scoreboard results for the 23 SWFs that participate in the 
IFSWF and the 21 funds that do not. The average score for the first group (65) is significantly higher than 
for the second group (42). The seven Asian SWFs on average score somewhat higher than the average for 
all the IFSWF funds, as is shown in table 2. As a result, the gap is substantial between the average score 
of Asian funds in the IFSWF and those that do not participate in this group. This difference may indicate 
Asian seriousness as well as Asian diversity.
One of the objectives of the Santiago Principles is to promote greater accountability and 
transparency on the part of SWFs. I have used the SWF scoreboard as the basis for assessing progress in 
this area and implicitly the impact to date of the work of the IWG of SWFs and the IFSWF. For this 
paper, we rescored the 11 Asian SWFs and three Asian pension funds based on information available in 
February 2011. Table 3 compares these results, based on information generally from late 2010 (hence, 
2010 score) with those in the SWF scoreboard published in Truman (2010), which was based on 
information available a year earlier (hence, 2009 score).
Five of the Asian SWFs record higher scores, but the average increase for all 11 funds is only two 
percentage points. With respect to Asian government pension funds, Japan’s fund now provides more 
information than before on its specific investments. Thailand’s fund now receives more credit by having a 
risk management policy, but loses a full point (three points on a scale of 100) because it has not published 
an audit since 2008.14 It is notable that the three SWFs for which we recorded substantial increases in 
scores—Korea, Australia, and China—are all members of the IFSWF. Moreover, the IFSWF is now 11
chaired by David Murray, Chairman of Australia's Future Fund Board of Guardians, and one of the two 
vice chairs is Jin Liqun, Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, China Investment Corporation.15 With 
leadership comes responsibility.
Table 4 presents a longer-term perspective on the extent of improvement in performances on the 
SWF scoreboard. Thirty three funds were scored in the 2007 edition of the scoreboard. Including the 
updated scores for nine of the Asian SWFs, the average improvement since 2007 has been 15 percentage 
points.16 With the latest results, the average improvement for the Asian funds is 21 percentage points, 
while the improvement for non-Asian SWFs was only 12 percentages points as of a year ago. Asian 
funds account for five of the nine funds with changes of more than 20 percentage points. Even initially 
high-scoring funds such as New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund have recorded a small improvement, and 
the lowest scoring Asian SWF of Brunei Darussalam has increased its score by 11 percentage points.
On the basis of this analysis, I conclude that the Santiago Principles are a very good first step toward 
improving the accountability and transparency of SWFs, albeit not as comprehensive and robust as they 
could be. SWFs that participate in the IFSWF score higher on the SWF scoreboard as well as on my 
application of the Santiago Principles, but there is substantial room for improvement for almost all funds 
on either standard. Although the Asian SWFs score higher on average than those of other regions of the 
world on both standards, and the scores of Asian funds on the SWF scoreboard have increased, in some 
cases dramatically, there remains substantial room for improvement on the part of almost all Asian as 
well as non-Asian funds. The IFSWF in mid-July will release a report on a survey of the experiences of its 
members with the application of the Santiago Principles. This will be a major test for the IFSWF. How 
comprehensive will the report be? How frank will the report be about the fact, documented in this paper, 
that on the SWF scoreboard and on my assessment of the Santiago Principles, several of the SWFs that 
are members of the IFSWF have low scores, starting with the Libyan Investment Authority, which it is 
impossible to score, but including the Qatar Investment Authority, and the Russian SWFs. 
Moreover, with respect to the Santiago Principles and the IFSWF, it is not enough that those funds 
linked to the IFSWF improve their scores; it is in the interest of those funds and to the IFSWF that the 
scores of all funds improve. Among other reasons, public attitudes in countries that are host to SWF 
investments are affected by the behavior of all funds, regardless of whether they are members of the 
IFSWF. In that connection, it is regrettable that the official membership in the IFSWF has been static 
since the IWG was first organized three years ago. Among the 20 SWFs listed in table 1 with total assets 
of more than $25 billion, seven are not directly associated with the IFSWF. They include three Asian 
SWFs, those of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam.1712
B. response to Swfs by Host countries
Countries with SWFs naturally have an interest in an open global investment regime.18 Representatives 
of SWFs and officials that are home to such funds have been vocal in expressing concerns about the 
potential for increased financial protectionism in countries that are host to SWF investments. Although 
some World Trade Organization agreements cover aspects of foreign investment, the principal governing 
framework in this area has been established by OECD members. Some non-members of the OECD have 
also embraced the framework. It consists of a number of codes, standards, and declarations adopted over 
more than five decades.19 
In the context of heightened interest and concerns about SWFs, in 2007 the G-7 leaders’ meeting 
in Germany and subsequently the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors’ meeting in 
Washington called for the development of guidance for recipient countries’ policies on investments by 
SWFs. This effort was motivated, in part, by increased anxiety about investments from countries that 
had not participated in drawing up the OECD framework in particular as it applied to investments 
by governmental entities, including SWFs. For the mature industrial countries, the shoe of openness 
to foreign investments was now on the other foot, and it was being worn by entities controlled by 
governments. Of course, the concerns about governmental investments were not directed solely at SWFs. 
The bulk of SWF investments do not involve control, but some SWF investments are controlling. On the 
other hand, helping to contribute to a more balanced view, at least a dozen countries that are members 
of the OECD have their own SWFs, or the equivalent in the form of government pension funds. Seven 
OECD countries participated in the IWG that drew up the Santiago Principles. Thus, the congruence 
between concerns about SWFs investments and other governmental cross-border investments and the 
sources of those investments is not perfect. A number of major host countries to SWF investments have a 
reciprocal stake in the fairness of applicable investment regimes to SWFs.
The OECD review resulted in no change in the framework applied to cross-border investments. 
That modest result in itself was significant and not foreordained when the OECD review started. In June 
2008, the OECD Ministerial Council adopted a declaration on SWFs that reaffirmed the applicability 
of the existing OECD framework to investments by such entities, implicitly rejecting a separate regime 
for them. In a companion step, in October 2008 the Investment Committee of the OECD issued a set 
of Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security. The legal status of 
those guidelines was raised in May 2009 by the OECD Council. The guidelines recognized that national 
security considerations could be used as an excuse to block foreign investments, including by SWFs. At 
the same time, they sought to establish broad principles to minimize discrimination, increase transparency 
and predictability, limit restrictions as narrowly as possible, and make countries accountable for their 
policies.13
How should one judge the OECD efforts? In my view, the good news is that there was no formal 
blessing of a tightening of investment regimes in response to perceived threats from SWFs. The bad news 
is that an opportunity was missed to expand the openness of the OECD regime in particular as it applies 
to SWFs. 
A number of initiatives would have been desirable in 2008-09. They are still desirable. First, the 
nondiscrimination provisions of OECD investment codes and standards are binding, in the loosest sense 
of that word because they are enforced only via peer reviews, only on members of the OECD alone. 
Demarolle (2008) uses the word “mandatory” to describe the OECD regime and contrasts that with 
the voluntary nature of the then-proposed best practices for SWFs. However, the comparison is not 
particularly apt because the OECD framework of nondiscrimination extends to nonmembers, as long as 
they are also members of the IMF, only on a best-endeavors basis. It would have been desirable to explore 
the possibility of broadening this nondiscrimination to the SWFs of nonmember countries, perhaps with 
an implicit quid pro quo in terms of the best practices for such funds that were then being worked out in 
the IWG of SWFs and ultimately became the Santiago Principles. This would have enhanced the stability 
and predictability of investment regimes in OECD countries.
Second, under the circumstances, including the crisis that was then breaking over the global 
economy and financial system, it is unfortunate that the OECD countries did not call for a meaningful 
standstill on new restrictive measures governing investment, instead of merely referencing a commitment 
to a standstill that had been observed in the breach for some time.
Third, individual OECD countries have invoked multiple exceptions to the investment principles 
and guidelines even as they apply to OECD members. In other words, what is weakly binding has many 
loopholes. It is unfortunate in this context that no effort apparently was made to limit those exceptions 
or, at a minimum, shine more light on them. The peer review processes at the OECD take the status quo, 
which includes exceptions, as the baseline and examine members’ policy actions against that baseline 
of national treatment. This is not a zero baseline. It does not contribute to a predictable investment 
framework.
Fourth, the new guidelines on foreign investment and national security concerns were a step forward 
in that they at least codified the issues. However, the obstacles to the creation of a level playing field are 
many. National security is a huge loophole in national investment policies through which garden variety 
of financial and other forms of protectionism can expand.
Consider some of the sectors that are exempted on national security grounds. In the United 
States, restrictions on foreign investment are justified on “essential security” grounds in three sectors: 
air and maritime transport; radio, broadcasting, and telephone; and (my favorite) maritime dredging 14
and salvaging. In the United Kingdom, there is a broad exclusion for controlling investments that are 
“contrary to the interests of the United Kingdom or a substantial part of it.” 
In general, the investment policies of many OECD members are inconsistent with the Investment 
Committee’s call for regulatory proportionality: “Restrictions on investment, or conditions on transaction, 
should not be greater than the need to protect national security and they should be avoided when other 
existing measures are adequate and appropriate to address a national security concern” (Gordon 2010, 
118). National security morphs into essential security. Essential security for some countries becomes 
in other countries public security (France), public order (France, Germany, and Japan), public safety 
(Germany and Japan), net benefits from foreign investment (Canada), gross benefits (New Zealand), or 
the national interest (Australia).
These are broad issues and they involve many types of cross-border investment, but in the context of 
reciprocal responsibility between home and host countries for SWF investments, several points stand out. 
Declared national and economic security interests are essentially unchallengeable under international law. 
However, that fact does not prevent the OECD from covering them under its peer review processes, and 
those processes could be opened up routinely to nonmember countries with SWFs of significant size.20 
Marchick and Slaughter (2008) paint a gloomy picture of the protectionist drift in national policies on 
inward foreign direct investment and prescribe a much longer list of desirable reforms, including a code 
of conduct covering national investment reviews, which they argue should be narrowly tailored and focus 
on national security and not on economic factors. In Truman 2010, I cite a number of recent instances in 
which proposed foreign investments from OECD countries in other OECD countries have been blocked. 
I also list a number of actions by major countries, including the United States, Germany, France, Italy, 
Australia, and Canada, to tighten their foreign investment regimes. 
My conclusion on the response of host countries to SWF investments is that SWFs in general, and 
Asian SWFs, in particular, face a global investment regime that is becoming less open. Countries with 
SWFs, in particular those that are not members of the OECD, have reasonable concerns.
4. concludIng oBServAtIonS 
Sovereign wealth funds have become a permanent, prominent feature of the international financial 
landscape. Even if they do not resume the spectacular rate of growth that characterized the period up 
to the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis in 2007, their relative importance is likely to 
increase by virtue of the shift of wealth from the mature industrial countries to other countries in which 
governments play a larger role in the management of national wealth. As a consequence, concerns about 
SWF investments, which are real though exaggerated, will remain. Those concerns have been ameliorated 15
somewhat over the past several years as SWFs have been demystified, including via the adoption of the 
Santiago Principles and the processes that lay behind that initiative. But the concerns have not gone away.
The Santiago Principles are an impressive monument to international financial cooperation, but 
they are only a start in the promotion of SWF accountability and transparency. The Santiago Principles 
need to be upgraded along the lines of my SWF scoreboard and compliance with the Principles must be 
further improved.
For their part, the OECD countries are a major destination for SWF investments. The OECD 
itself is the leading standard setter on cross-border investment regimes. The OECD has succeeded 
in not erecting new barriers to SWF investments, but it has failed to roll back the creeping financial 
protectionism of the past decade. The openness of the global investment regime can and should be 
improved for SWFs as well as for other forms of cross-border investments.
What about Asian SWFs? Is Asia different? Asia is a major player in the SWF universe. Because of 
the size of some Asian SWFs and differences in the source of funding of many Asian funds, they create 
more anxiety in potential host countries. As a result, those Asian funds will be held to a higher standard of 
accountability and transparency. Thus, it is in Asia’s interest to promote increased compliance with SWF 
standards in Asia and elsewhere. It is also in Asia’s interest to press not only for greater openness to SWF 
and other cross-border investments but also to lead by example.
endnoteS
1. The IWG (2008, 3) agreed: “SWFs are special purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to 
achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets.” The 
IWG noted that “general government includes both central government and subnational government.” It added, “SWFs 
are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of 
privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.” This language on the financial resources 
used to establish and expand SWFs is also found in the IMF’s Sixth Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position Manual (IMF 2009a).
2. The distinction between social security reserve funds, such as some of those listed in table 1 as government pension 
funds, and government pension reserve funds, as defined by the IWG and listed in table 1, is also not entirely straight 
forward. See Blundell-Wignall, Hu, and Yermo (2008).
3. Table 1 does not include Saudi Arabia. Some analysts include part of the foreign exchange reserves and other 
international assets on the books of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority as a SWF.
4. Of course, the funding of SWFs from exports of natural resources requires the accumulation of foreign exchange, but 
none of the countries listed as funding their SWFs from foreign exchange reserves has a dominant export commodity.
5. See Truman (2007). Gelpern (2011) expands on this matrix by considering four axes of SWF accountability and 
associated demands on SWFs which stand in uneasy relation to each other: public internal (citizens and the general 
public), private internal (specific groups of beneficiaries and constituencies within the country), public external 
(obligations based on explicit or implicit international norms or standards), and private external (obligations grounded in 
laws and regulations).16
6. The 23 members of the IWG subsequently formed a permanent International Forum of SWFs (IFSWF) to promote 
an exchange of ideas and views among SWFs, share views on the application of the Santiago Principles, and encourage 
cooperation with recipient countries. One feature of the IWG and the IFSWF is that the two groups have endeavored to 
maintain an open dialogue with countries that are host to SWF investments. Of course, a number of members of the IWG 
and IFSWF are not only home but also are important hosts to SWFs, including the United States which is home to the 
Alaska Permanent Fund, which is a SWF participant. As reported in table 1, three other US states also have SWFs.
7. Truman 2008b, first released in 2007, contains SWF scoreboard 1.0. Truman 2008a contains the SWF scoreboard 2.0. 
Truman 2010 contains the SWF scoreboard 3.0, which is employed in this paper. The precise elements included in each 
scoreboard differ slightly, but the basic design is the same.
8. See Truman 2010 chapter 5, including the appendix, for more details.
9. Because some of the Santiago Principles match up with more than one of the elements in the SWF scoreboard, only 
20 of the 30 principles and subprinciples have counterparts in the scoreboard. Moreover, the judgment that 25 of the 
elements in the scoreboard are represented in the Santiago Principles is based on a generous interpretation of what is called 
for in the principles in terms of public disclosure. On a narrower interpretation, only 17 elements in the scoreboard are 
captured by the Santiago Principles. However, the broad conclusions from comparison of the two standards are unaffected 
by these distinctions. See Truman 2010 chapter 6, including the appendix, for a fuller comparison of the SWF scoreboard 
and the Santiago Principles.
10. Table 2 incorporates the updated scores for ADIA reported in Truman 2010. For both the SWF scoreboard and the 
Santiago Principles, the results are presented on a scale of 100 to facilitate comparison.
11. The one SWF with estimated assets of more than $48 billion that we did not score, because of a lack of information, is 
the Libyan Investment Authority. Including that fund would lower the average score for these largest funds.
12. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is in the same position.
13. In the OECD versus non-OECD comparison Chile, Korea, and Mexico are included in the OECD. The SWFs of 
those countries are included with the non-OECD countries in the other comparisons.
14. The changes for both Asian SWFs and Asian government pension funds are similar using the Santiago Principles as the 
standard.
15. The other vice chair is Bader Mohammad Al-Sa’ad, Managing Director of the Kuwait Investment Authority.
16. As few of the elements in the scoreboard changed between the 2007 edition (SWE scoreboard 1.0) and the 2010/2011 
edition (SWF scoreboard 3.0); see Truman 2010. However, those small changes do not alter the broad thrust of the results 
presented in table 4 although they do account for the small decline in the score for Timor-Leste’s SWF. As with table 2, 
table 4 incorporates the updated score for ADIA based on its 2010 annual report issued in March 2010 and reported in 
Truman (2010).
17. The other SWFs are those of Algeria and Kazakhstan and two funds in the UAE, which is a country that participated 
in the IFSWF. It has been reported that representatives of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea 
participated in the May 2010 meeting of the IFSWF and that Malaysia has become a new member, but no formal 
announcement has been about Malaysia’s status. 
18. The discussion in this and the following paragraphs draws upon Truman (2010, chapter 7).
19. See Gordon 2010 as well as Truman 2010 for details.
20. The OECD, as described in Gordon 2010, has made some laudable efforts to expand the peer review process and 
institute roundtables that involve nonmembers well as members.17
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Table 1     Sovereign wealth funds and government pension funds 
Country  Current name§ 
Date 
Established Source of Funds 








UAE (Abu Dhabi) Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority
1976 Natural resources 627‡ 627‡
Norway  Government Pension 
Fund-Global 
1990 Natural resources 512 512
China China Investment 
Corporation
2007 Foreign exchange reserves  332 81
Hong Kong  Exchange Fund 1993 Foreign exchange reserves, 
fiscal surpluses 
277 257
Singapore Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation 
1981 Foreign exchange reserves, 
fiscal surpluses, employee 
contributions
248‡ 248
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
1953 Natural resources 203 203
Singapore  Temasek Holdings  1974 Government enterprises  133 126
Russia  National Welfare and 
Reserve Funds
2004 Natural resources 116 116
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority  2005 Natural resources 85 85
Australia  Future Fund (PR) 2006 Fiscal surpluses 73 18
Libya  Libyan Investment 
Authority†
1981 Natural resources 70 70
UAE (Dubai)  Investment Corporation of 
Dubai 
2006 Natural resources 70‡  70‡ 
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund  2000 Natural resources 57‡ 57‡
UAE (Abu Dhabi) International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
1984 Natural resources 48 48
United States  Alaska Permanent Fund  1976 Natural resources 39 14
Kazakhstan  National Fund  2000 Natural resources 39 39
Korea  Korea Investment 
Corporation 
2005 Foreign exchange reserves 37 37
Ireland  National Pensions Reserve 
Fund (PR)
2001 Fiscal surpluses 33 9‡
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency  1983 Natural resources 30‡ 30‡
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional 1993 Fiscal surpluses 25 2‡
UAE (Abu Dhabi) Mubadala Development 
Company
2002 Natural resources 23 9‡
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund  1999 Natural resources 23 23
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund  2000 Natural resources 23 23
Venezuela  National Development 
Fund 
2005 Natural resources 15‡ 15‡
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings 
Trust Fund 
1976 Natural resources 15 5
New Zealand  Superannuation Fund (PR) 2001 Fiscal surpluses 13 9
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Table 1     Sovereign wealth funds and government pension funds  (continued)
Country  Current name§ 
Date 
Established Source of Funds 








Chile  Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund 
1985 Natural resources 13 13
UAE (Dubai)  Dubai International Capital  2004 Natural resources 13‡  12‡ 
UAE (Dubai)  Istithmar World  2003 Natural resources 12‡  12‡ 
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding 
Company 
2006 Natural resources 9 7‡
Brazil  Sovereign Wealth Fund of 
Brazil†
2009 Fiscal surpluses 9 4‡
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  1980 Natural resources 8 8
Timor-Leste  Petroleum Fund  2005 Natural resources 7 7
Botswana  Pula Fund  1993 Natural resources 6 6
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization 
Fund 
2000 Natural resources 5‡ 5‡
United States  Permanent Mineral Trust 
Fund (Wyoming) 
1974 Natural resources 5 0.8
United States  Severance Tax Permanent 
Fund (New Mexico)
1973 Natural resources 3.5 0.5‡
Chile  Pension Reserve Fund (PR) 1985 Fiscal surpluses 3.4 3.4
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization 
Fund 
2007 Natural resources 3 3
United States  Alabama Trust Fund 2000 Natural resources 2.4 1.7‡
Colombia  Oil Stabilization Fund† 1995 Natural resources 2.1‡ 2.1‡
UAE (RAK)  RAK Investment Authority† 2004 Natural resources 1.2‡ 1.2‡
China Shanghai Financial 
Holdings†
2007 Fiscal surpluses 1.0‡ 1.0‡
Venezuela  Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Fund 
2003 Natural resources 0.8 0.8
Canada  Fonds des générations†  2006 Natural resources 0.6‡ 0.2‡
Turkmenistan Stabilization Fund  2008 Fiscal surpluses 0.5‡ 0.5‡
UAE  Emirates Investment 
Authority 
2007 Natural resources 0.5‡ 0.5‡
UAE (Dubai)  DIFC Investments  2006 Natural resources 0.5‡ 0.5‡
Vietnam State Capital Investment 
Corporation 
2005 Fiscal surpluses 0.5 0.5
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  2004 Natural resources 0.5 0.5
Gabon  Fund for Future Generations  1998 Natural resources 0.4‡ 0.4‡
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization 
Reserve Fund 
1956 Natural resources 0.4 0.4
Uganda  Poverty Action Fund† 1998 Savings from Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) debt relief initiative, 
donor contributions, and 
fiscal surpluses 
0.4‡ 0.4‡
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Table 1     Sovereign wealth funds and government pension funds  (continued)
Country  Current name§ 
Date 
Established Source of Funds 








Mauritania  National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon Reserves†
2006 Natural resources 0.3 0.3
Angola  Reserve Fund for Oil† 2007 Natural resources 0.2‡ 0.2‡
Papua New Guinea  Mineral Resources 
Stabilization Fund†
1974 Natural resources 0.2‡ 0.2‡
Sudan  Oil Revenue Stabilization 
Account
2002 Natural resources 0.1‡ 0.1‡
São Tomé and Príncipe  National Oil Account  2004 Natural resources 0.1 0.1
Nauru  Phosphate Royalties 
Stabilization Fund†
1968 Natural resources 0.06‡ 0.06‡
Equatorial Guinea  Fund for Future† 2006 Natural resources 0.03‡ 0.03‡
Subtotal  3,276 2,826
    of which
    Asian Funds





Government Pension Funds 
Japan Government Pension 
Investment Fund 
1961 Employee contributions  1,414 253
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds 
ABP 
1922 Employee contributions  317 282
United States  California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System
1932 Employee contributions  226 49
Canada Caisse de dépôt placement 
du Québec 
1965 Employee contributions  192 69
China National Social Security Fund  2000 Fiscal surpluses 147 29
Canada  Canada Pension Plan  1966 Employee contributions  140 77
Canada  Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Plan 
1917 Employee contributions  91 46
France  Fonds de réserve pour les 
retraites 
2001 Fiscal surpluses 49 39
Thailand  Government Pension Fund  1996 Employee contributions 
and fiscal surpluses 
16 3
Subtotal  2,592 847
    of which
    Asian Funds





Total  5,868 3,673
     of which 
     Asian Funds





† excluded from the SWF scoreboard. 
‡ estimate.
§ PR denotes pension reserve fund. ASIAN funds in italics.
Sources: National authorities, International Monetary Fund, other public sources. 21 4





Principles  Difference 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Norway Government Pension Fund- Global  97 96
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (PR)  94 98 4
United States  Alaska Permanent Fund 92 96 4
United States Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund 91 96 5
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund (PR)  86 94 8
Timor-Leste  Petroleum Fund  85 80 –5
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund  83 82
Australia  Future Fund (PR)  80 90 10
United States  New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund  80 80 0
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  76 76 0
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  74 80 6
Singapore  Temasek Holdings  73 82 9
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund  71 70
Hong Kong Exchange Fund  70 74 4
Chile Pension Reserve Fund  68 68 0
United States  Alabama Trust Fund  68 76 8
Kazakhstan  National Fund  65 67 2
Singapore  Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  65 78 13
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority  63 71 8
Korea Korea Investment Corporation  60 67 7
UAE (Abu Dhabi)  Mubadala Development Company  59 66 7
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  58 71 13
China  China Investment Corporation  57 60 3
Botswana  Pula Fund  56 62 6
UAE (Dubai)  Dubai International Capital  55 62 7
Russia Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund  50 52 2
São Tomé and Príncipe  National Oil Account  48 58 10
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional 44 48 4
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization Fund  44 42 –2
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 35 44 9
Vietnam  State Capital Investment Corporation 35 42 7
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company  30 32 2
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund 29 32 3
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 29 32 3
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  29 34 5
Venezuela  Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund  27 28 1
National Development Fund  27 25 –2
UAE (Abu Dhabi)  International Petroleum Investment Company  26 26 0
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  23 26 3
(table continues on next page)22 5





Principles  Difference 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Brunei Darussalam  Brunei Investment Agency  21 28 7
UAE (Dubai) Investment Company of Dubai 21 22 1
Sudan  Oil Revenue Stabilization Account  18 16 –2
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority  15 15 0
UAE (Dubai)  Istithmar World  15 16 1
Subtotal ‡ 54 58 4
     of which 
     Asian Funds 
     Non-Asian Funds
     of which
     IFSWF Funds 
       of which Asian 
     Non-IFSWF Funds 



















Government Pension Funds 
United States  California Public Employees’ Retirement System  95 96 1
Canada Canada Pension Plan 92 96 4
Canada  Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec   89 98 9
France Fonds de réserve pour les retraites  89 92 3
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP  85 84
Japan  Government Pension Investment Fund  84 89 5
Canada Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 83 86 3
Thailand Government Pension Fund  78 81 3
China National Social Security Fund 70 74 4
Subtotal ‡ 85 88 3
    of which 
    Asian Funds







Total ‡ 60 63 4
      of which 
      Asian







† PR denotes pension reserve fund. ASIAN funds in italics.
‡ average of funds.
Sources: Author’s calculations, Truman (2010). 23 6
Table 3     Updated SWF Scoreboard for Asian Funds  
Country  Fund  2010 Score  2009 Score  Change
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
New Zealand  Superannuation Fund 94 94 0
Australia  Future Fund 88 80 8
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 85 85 0
Singapore  Temasek 74 73 2
Hong Kong  Hong Kong Exchange Fund 70 70 0
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 68 60 8
Singapore  Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  65 65 0
China  China Investment Corporation 62 57 5
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional 45 44 2
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 35 35 0
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 21 21 0
Subtotal† 64 62 2
Government Pension Funds
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund 86 84 2
Thailand Government Pension Fund 77 78 –2
China National Social Security Fund 70 70 0
Subtotal† 78 77 0
Total† 67 65 2
† average of funds.
Sources: Author’s calculations, Truman (2010). 24
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Table 4     Comparison of SWF Scoreboards 






Singapore  Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  65 56
UAE (Abu Dhabi)  Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  58 54
UAE (Abu Dhabi)  Mubadala Development Company  59 47
China  China Investment Corporation  62 38
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund  83 34
Korea Korea Investment Corporation  68 32
Australia  Future Fund (PR)  88 26
United States  Alaska Permanent Fund 92 22
Singapore  Temasek Holdings  74 20
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization Fund  44 16
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority  63 15
United States  California Public Employees’ Retirement System (P)  95 14
Russia Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund  50 12
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund 29 11
Brunei Darussalam  Brunei Investment Agency  21 11
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  76 10
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund  71 9
Kazakhstan  National Fund  65 7
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional 45 7
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 29 7
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority  15 7
Norway Government Pension Fund 97 5
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 35 5
Venezuela  Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund  27 5
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (PR)  94 4
Venezuela  National Development Fund  27 3
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  23 3
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  74 2
UAE (Dubai)  Istithmar World  15 2
Botswana  Pula Fund  56 0
São Tomé and Príncipe  National Oil Account  48
Timor-Leste  Petroleum Fund  85 –2
Sudan  Oil Revenue Stabilization Account  18 –2
Average  56 15
        of which 
        Asian 





† P denotes government pension fund and PR denotes pension reserve fund. ASIAN funds in italics.
‡ The most recent scores for Asias SWFs (table 3) and the Abu Dhabi Investment Agency are from 2010; all other scores are 
from 2009. 
Sources: Author’s calculations, Truman (2010). 